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W. E. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. GLEN E. REED et al.,
Defendants; ROBERT M. CAIRNS et al., Appellants.
[1] Negotiable Instruments - Presumptions - Consideration.
Where defendants appear as ordinary joint makers of a promissory note, it "is deemed prima facie to have been issued for
a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature
appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value"
( Civ. Code, § 3105), which means that each defendant is
presumed to have received value from the loan of money made
by plaintiff payee; a presumption of consideration arose, and
it is also presumed that the note "was given or endorsed for a
sufficient consideration" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 21)
and that "there was a good and sufficient consideration for
a written contract." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 39.)
[2] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Where Evidence on One
Side Consists of Presumption.-The presumption that a note
is supported by a consideration is evidence to be weighed
against a maker's testimony that he did not receive consideration, and with this conflict the trial court's finding that a
consideration passed should not be disturbed.
[3] Negotiable Instruments-Evidence-Accommodation Makers.
-Evidence that defendant makers of a promissory note were
to receive real benefits from a loan made by plaintiff payee,
rather than a mere motive on their part of wanting to help a
codefendant, support an inference that defendants were to
receive value from the loan and thus were not accommodation
makers.
[4] Election of Remedies-What Amounts to Election.-Where a
payee's agreement to accept, in settlement of old notes, a certain sum of money to be paid in full by a designated date is
not a novation and does not release the obligor's comakers on
the original notes, the mere reduction of the new obligation
to judgment is not an election which estops the payee from
maintaining an action on the original obligation, since such
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, § 216; Am.Jur., Bills and
Notes, § 1002 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1) Negotiable Instruments, § 216; [21
Appeal and Error, § 1290; [3] Negotiable Instruments, § 266; [ 4]
Election of Remedies, § 7; [ 5] Negotiable Instruments, § 20; [ 6, 8)
Parties, § 15; [7, 9] Judgments, § 345.1; [10] Chattel Mortgages,
§ 69; [11, 12] Mortgages, § 299; [13] Interest, § 29; [14] Interest, § 34.
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judgment does not
the payee's
accept the
agreed sum of money in satisfaction of the
notes.
[5] Negotiable Instruments-Construction-Joint and Several ObIigations.-Where a note signed by several defendants is in
the form of a promise made in the singular number and
executed by each defendant, it is presumed that the promise
is joint and several. (Civ. Code, §§ 1660, 3098, subd. (7).)
[6] Parties-.Joinder.-Joint obligors on the same contract are
indispensable parties; they may not be sued separately.
[7] Judgments-Res Judicata-Judgment Against Joint Obligors.
-A judgment obtained in a separate action against one of
several joint obligors bars an action against the others.
[8] Parties-Joinder.-When an obligation is joint and severn!,
it is not nonjoinder to sue one obligor alone.
[9] Judgments-Res Judicata-Judgment Against Joint and Several Obligors.-Except for the possible effect of Code Civ.
Proc., § 726, providing that there can be but one form of
action for recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage, a judgment obtained against one maker of joint and several promissory notes in a separate action against him would not preclude
the payee from bringing subsequent actions against the obligor's comakers.
[10] Chattel Mortgages-Foreclosure-Rights and Remedies.-A
payee who agrees with one signer to accept, in settlement of
old notes, a certain sum of money to be paid in full by a
designated date does not waive the security of a chattel
mortgage securing such notes and thereby lose his right to
proceed against cosigners, where such settlement agreement
does not operate as a novation cancelling the original notes
and ehattel mortgage.
[11] Mortgages- Remedies- Restriction to Foreclosure.- Civ.
Code, 2953, prohibiting a borrower from waiving the benefit
of a resort to mortgage security at the time of or in connection with making the loan or execution of the mortgage, does
not preclude him from subsequently waiving the rights and
privileges conferred on him by Code Civ. Proc., § 726, prescribing foreclosure as the one form of remedy for recovery of
a debt secured by a mortgage.
[12] Id.- Remedies- Restriction to Foreclosure.- The mere
recordation of a judgment obtained against one joint and
several maker of promissory notes in a separate action against
him on another agreement, and issuance but not levy of
execution, would not estop the payee from claiming any
mortgage interest in the property and thereby preclude him
[8] See Cal.Jur., Parties, § 17; Am.Jur., Parties, § 39.

\VILI,IAMS

v.

HEED

59

[48 C.2d 57; 307 P.2d 353]

---------------------

a

against the maker's

Interest-Usury-Elements.--\Vhen a transaction violates the
usury law the intent of the parties is immaterial, nor is it
material that the borrower rather than the lender took the
initiative in the transaction.
Id.-Usury-Effect.-Where plaintifT brought an action on
two promissory notes constituting a
transaction, one
for $30,000 bearing 5 per cent interest, the other for $10,000,
and the $10,000 note was clearly usurious because given as a
"bonus" for the $30,000 loan, he lost the right to claim or
collect interest in any amount; the whole transaction was
tainted by usury, and it was immaterial that plaintiff dismissed the portion of his action on the $10,000 note.

APPEAl; from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Contra Costa County. Hugh H. Donovau, ,Judge. ,Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Action to enforce payment of promissory notes alH1 to foredose a chattel mortgage given as security. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Athearn, Chandler & Hoffman, F. G. Athearn, IJeigh
Athearn, Theodore P. Lambros, Carlson, Collins, Gordon &
Bold and Roscoe E. Jordan for Appellants.
Herron & Winn and John ·wynne Herron for Hespondent.
CAR'l'ER, J.-'l'his is an appeal by defendants Arvidson,
Carroll and Cairns, makers (with Reed who does not appeal)
of a $30,000 promissory note, from a deficiency judgment,
after sale under a securing chattel mortgage, in favor of
plaintiff, payee of the note.
Two negotiable notes, one for $30,000, bearing 5 per cent
interest, and the other for $10,000, were dated June 14, 1950.
The first became due in 60 days and the second on December 14, 1950, and named all the makers as such with plaintiff
as payee. They recited that "I" promise to pay the principal
and interest. The notes were secured by a chattel mortgagt'
executed by Heed covering property owned by him. After
this case was reversed on an appeal by plaintiff from a summary judgment for all the makers but Reed, who defaulted
(Williams v. Reed, 113 Cal.App.2d 195 [248 P.2d 147]),
plaintiff dismissed the portion of the action pertaining to
the $10,000 note and the trial proceeded on the $30,000 note.
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The $10,000 note was given as a ''bonus'' for the $30,000
loan, and was, therefore, usurious, hence the action thereon
was dismissed. This action was commenced to foreclose the
chattel mortgage and for a deficiency judgment for the balance due; the amount realized at the foreclosure sale ($687)
was credited on the note. The judgment awarded interest
and attorney's fees (provided for in the note) on the $30,000
note. Soon after the maturity of the notes, and on October 12,
1950, an agreement with reference to the notes was made
between plaintiff and Heed and his wife. Before the instant
action was commenced, plaintiff obtained judgment against
Heed on that agreement, but the judgment has not been paid
or satisfied.
The main defenses of defendants-makers, except Reed,
were that the agreement made October 12, 1950, between
Reed and his wife and plaintiff, wherein plaintiff agreed to
accept and Reed to pay $35,000 on October 28, 1950, to
discharge the two notes which had in effect extended the
time for payment two and one-half months on the $30,000
note, was a novation-a substitute for the notes, thus exonerating them; that they were accommodation makers only,
having received no value, and under section 3110 of the Civil
Code, 1 were liable only as sureties, and the October 12th
agreement freed them from liability because it changed the
obligation (see Civ. Code, §§ 2819, 2822) ; that the judgment
for plaintiff in his action on the agreement achieved the same
results and constituted an election of remedies; that the action
will not lie because of failure to comply with section 726
of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 The trial court found against
all of these contentions.
Several matters are settled by the former decision on
appeal. ( W illiarns v. Reed, supra, 113 Cal.App.2d 195.)
Reserving the question of whether defendants (other than
Reed) were accommodation makers and entitled to the application of surety law which was said to be a factual question,
it was held that the October 12th agreement showed no intent
"'An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as
maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor,
and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such
a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him
to be only an accommodation party." (Civ. Code, § 3110.)
2
' ' There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt,
or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real or
personal property, which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. • . . "
(Code Civ. Proc., § 726.)
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on its face for novation releasing such defendants; that the
judgment on that agreement, there being no execution, was
not an election which estopped plaintiff; that the security of
the chattel mortgage was not waived to the prejudice of those
defendants to render them not liable; that even if the agreement was a novation as to Reed it would not release the other
defendants; and that the right of action was not controlled
by section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The opinion
of the court closed with the statement that it did not intend
to foreclose the determination of any issue of fact including
novation.
Defendant Cairns (the other defendants filed no brief but
join in Cairns' brief) contends that he was an accommodation
maker, and under the laws of suretyship as applied to him,
the October 12th agreement changed the obligation and released him from liability. 3 Assuming an accommodation
maker is in such position, the basic question is whether there
is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that
he and the other defendants were not aecommodation makers
because they received value. It will be reealled that under
section 3110 of the Civil Code, supra, a maker is not an
accommodation one unless he did not receive value for signing the instrument, and defendant asserts that the value
must have been from the consideration for the note-from
the payee (plaintiff) rather than from Reed, the accommodated maker, for lending his name to the instrument (citing
Britton, Bills and Notes (1943), p. 365; 11 C.J.S., Bills and
Notes, § 742). Accepting the foregoing premise as correct,
it appears that the evidence is sufficient as to all the defendants.
[1] In the first place it should be observed that the
defendants appear as ordinary joint makers of a negotiable
note and thus ''Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima
facie to have been issued for a valuable eonsideration; and
every person whose signature appears thereon to have become
a party thereto for value.'' ( Civ. Code, § 3105.) This
clearly means that everyone who appeared to be a party to
the instrument (defendants appeared as makers here) was
"There is a conflict of authority as to whether an accommodation
maker of a negotiable instrument is in the position of a surety and
has all the defenses available to a surety (see Mortgage Guarantee Co.
v. Chotiner, 8 Cal.2d 110 [64 P.2d 138, 108 A.L.R. 1080]; Britton,
Bills and Notes, p. 1121 et seq.; 2 A.L.R.2d 260).
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presumed to have received value from the loan of money
made by the plaintiff payee ; a presumption of consideration
arose (Weiss v. First Sav. Bank, 28 Cal.App.2d 140, 146
[82 P.2d 45, 83 P.2d 35]). Among the presumptions also
is the rebuttable one ''That a promissory note or bill of
exchange was given or endorsed for a sufficient consideration''
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. (21)), and "That there was
a good and sufficient consideration for a written contract"
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. ( 39)). [2] ''
he writing
[promissory note] itself carries the presumption of consideration which is evidence to be weighed against this defendant's testimony. With this conflict, the finding of the trial
court that a consideration passed should not be disturbed.''
(Rodaba1lgh v. Kmrffrnan, 53 Cal.App. 676, 679 [200 P. 747] ;
see also Moore v. Gould, 151 Oa1. 723, 726 [91 P. 616] ; Pacific
Portland Cement Co., Consol. v. Reinecke, 30 Cal.App. 501
[158 P. 1041] ; Ellington v. Ft·eer, 111 Cal.App. 651 [295
P. 857].) Hence it follows that there was a presumption that defendants all received value from the plaintiff's
loan of money. [3] Moreover, it may be inferred from the
evidence that defendants received some benefit from the loan.
Defendants and Reed had known each other for some time
prior to the execution of the note and were enjoying business
relations. Reed agreed to assist them in organizing various
projects and foundations in which they were interested.
rrhose projects were beneficial to defendants, and Reed purported to be able to obtain funds for them from eastern
capital. Defendant Cairns testified that plaintiff was assisting him in organizing Cairns' Agricultural Research Foundation to study and develop plant nutrition and soil in
which he had long been interested; that the foundation was
not philanthropic; that he \vould realize gains from it by
selling products from the research; that he had no funds
to finance such a foundation, but Reed told him he could
obtain them from the East and advance the project for him;
that he would install an irrigation system on Reed's ranch
for the latter's services in obtaining finances for the foundation; that he wanted Reed to get the $30,000 for his financial
difficulties so he could continue performing for his interests
in the foundation; that he said nothing when he signed the
note concerning the capacity in which he signed it, indicating
that he was an ordinary comaker. Plaintiff testified (Cairns
also) that before Cairns signed the note he telephoned Reed
to see if time enough was allowed for repayment and if it
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all
indicating Cairns' interest m Reed receiving
loan to beneflt Cairns.
Reed testified by deposition, ''There is no question but that
all three of these men-and I am referring to .Arvidson,
and Cairns-were to benefit, either directly or infrom the $30,000.00 loan; is that correct? .ANSWER:
That is right"; that an automobile Reed got from Cairns was
in part paymellt for his services; that he had "obligations"
on his ranch that must be met and the ranch was to go into
the defendants' foundations; that "In addition, prior to
June 14, 1950, I had formed for Carroll and .Arvidson and
the company, which is known as \Vest Coast Industrial EnThis operating company was set up with Carroll
and defendant .Arvidson as officers and managers. In addion or about June 14, 1950, I had created an agricultural
research foundation for defendant Robert M. Cairns and
also an operation company for this foundation. Defendant
Cairns and his wife were officers in said organization. These
organizations were designed so that a profit would be made
by defendants Carroll, Arvidson and Cairns in accordance
with their duties as officers of organization. .At the time of
the execution of the subject notes, there was yet no work to
be clone by me to get said foundation and operating company
in operation. In addition, money was needed to get said
organization into operation. On June 14, 1950, I had an
interest in a valuable farm at Walnut Creek, which interest
I had acquired by means of a written contract of sale. It
was agreed by the defendants and myself that said farm would
become an asset of the foundation and operating company.
However, on June 14, 1950, at the time said notes were
executed I was in default on the contract of sale and money
was borrowed by all of us from plaintiff Williams to make
payments due on the farm."
The foregoing is sufficient from which the trial court
could infer that all the defendants realized or were to receive
value from the loan of the money and thus were not accommodation makers. There ·were real benefits to be received by
defendants from the loan transaction, rather than a mere
motive on their part of wanting to help Reed. There is evidence to the contrary to the effect that the $30,000 was only
for Reed's personal benefit but that merely creates a conflict .
.At least with the presumption of valuable consideration
present, the evidence which tends to support it sufficiently
contradicts the contrary evidence. In Gardiner v. Holcomb,
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82 Cal.App. 342, 353 [255 P. 523], it is said: "While a
party's intent may be to aid a maker of a note by lending
his credit, if he seeks to accomplish thereby legitimate objects
of his own and not simply to aid the maker the act is not
for aecommodation." (See also Irwin v. Colbttrn, 56 Cal.
App. 41 [204 P. 551].)
[ 4] Defendants assert there was an "election of rights"
Ly plaintiff in suing and obtaining judgment against Reed
on the October 12th agreement, recording an abstract of the
judgment, and having a writ of execution issue (no levy of
the writ was made and nothing was realized from it) which
forecloses the instant action of foreclosure on the notes and
chattel mortgage; they concede that the October 12th agreement was not, as found by the trial court, a novation. That
contention in part was answered by the former appeal in
this case when the judgment had been obtained but no execution had been issued. The court there said: ''Was the
reduction of Reed's October, 1950, obligat,ion to judgment
an election which estops plaintiff f1·om maintaining the present action? If the October, 1950, agreement was not a novation and did not release Reed's co makers on the original notes,
it is difficult to see how the mere reduction of Reed's October
obligation to judgment (a judgment not yet satisfied in whole
or in part) could give that obligation a different effect. In
October Reed promised to pay plaintiff a certain sum of
money. In November the court found that Reed for a valuable consideration promised to pay plaintiff that sum of
money, and decreed that plaintiff have judgment against Reed
for that amount of money. That judgment does not import
any new factor into the situation. It affords plaintiff a better
muniment of title to Reed's October promise to pay. It does
not modify plaintiff's promise to accept that amount of
money, and nothing but money (no mere added muniment
of title to Reed's promise) in satisfaction of the original
notes of June, 1950.
[5] "The parties agree that upon the basis of the record
before us the obligations of the defendants as comakers of the
original notes were joint and several. Each note was in the
form of a promise made in the singular number and executed
by each of the defendants. In such a case there is a presumption that the promise is joint and several ( Civ. Code, §§ 1660,
3098, subd. (7)).
''Reed's co makers claim that in such a case the bringing
of an action against one of the makers (Reed) without join-
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the others, and obtaining jw1gmcnt against him alone,
bars the plaintiff from laiPt' suing any of the others in respect
to that obligation. They cite cases from other jurisdictions,
none from California. Those cases are not applicable. Three
of them involved joint, not joint and several, obligations:
Fleming v. Ross ( 1906), 225 Ill. 149 [ 80 N.E. 92, 8 Ann.
Cas. 314]; JJ1organ v. Eduar (1929), 107 W.Va. 536 [149
S.E. 606]; and Pedderson v. Goode (19:14), 112 Colo. 38 [145
P.2d 981]. The remaining (·ase, Taylor v. Sartorious (1908),
135l\1o.App. 23 [108 S.\V. 1089], involve(1 a joint and several
obligation. 'l'he court recognized that joint and several
obligors may be sued separately but held that those later
sued get the benefit of a judgment favorable to the obligor first
sued, to the extent that he successfully defended. [6] It is
true in most jurisdictions, including California, that joint
obligors upon the same eontract are indispensable parties.
They may not be sued separately [eitations]. [7] If judgment is obtained in a separate action against one, it bars an
adiou against the others. [Citation.] [8] When the obligation is joint and several, it is not nonjoinder to sue one alone
ieitations]. The same is true of an aetion against one or more
and less than all of a number of persons jointly and severally
obligated as tort feasors. In such a ease the judgment obtained
against one is not a bar to an action against the remaining
joint and several obligors. 'Nothing short of satisfaction in
some form constitutes a bar . . . ' ( Grwndel v. Union Iron
Works, 127 Cal. 438, 442 [59 P. 826, 78 Am.St.Rep. 75, 47
hR.A. 467] .) [Citations.] That being so in respect to joint
and several tort obligors under a contract. . . . [9] Accordingly, but for the possible effect of section 726 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, a mere judgment against Reed in a separate
aetion against him upon the original notes would not preclude
plaintiff from bringing subsequent actions against Reed's
eo makers.
"But plaintiff's former action was not brought upon the
original notes. It was brought against Reed upon his separate agreement of Oetober, 1950, to which none of the other
note makers was a party." (Emphasis added; Williams v.
Reed, S1lpra, 113 Cal.App.2d 195, 203.) The added facts
that a writ of execution was obtained and the judgment was
recorded add nothing to the picture; defendants did not
change their position in reliance thereon. In fact, if anything they were possibly benefited by a partial exhaustion
48 C.2d-3
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of rights against Heed and, as said on the former appeal,
quoted supra, "Nothing short of satisfaction in some form
constitutes a bar" against an action against the comakers.
[10] In connection with this same argument defendants
rely on section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Sttpra, and
say the right of action for a deficiency after sale under the
chattel mortgage, which was the only action that could be
brought, was lost because of the judgment on the October
12th agreement, and the issuance of execution, and recording
of the judgment. This also is in part answered on the former
appeal, the court stating: "Has the plaintiff waived the
security of the chattel mortgage to the prejttdice of the rights
of Reed's cosigners and thereby lost his right to proceed
against them? Reed's cosigners direct attention to section
726 of the Code of Civil Procedure which declares that
' [t] here can be but one form of action for the recovery of
any debt, or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage
upon real or personal property, which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter,' and prescribes
the circumstances under which a deficiency judgment may
be obtained and the manner and method of determining the
amount of such judgment. They then claim that plaintiff
has disabled himself from resorting to the security of the
chattel mortgage and has thereby prevented himself from
getting a deficiency or personal judgment against them.
"This came about, they say, because the October, 1950,
agreement with Reed operated as a novation which cancelled
the original notes and as a necessary consequence extinguished
the chattel mortgage. This argument lacks merit for the
reason, as we have seen, no novation occurred by the mere
execution of the October, 1950, agreement.
"They further contend that 'even if no novation had been
entered into, and the plaintiff had brought this action . . .
against Reed alone on the notes and recovered judgment, the
plaintiff would have been only an unsecured judgment
creditor, and the lien of the mortgage would have been lost.'
\Vhether or not such a suit by plaintiff reduced to judgment
would have lost him the mortgage seems immaterial. He did
not bring an action on the 'notes.' He brought an action on
the October, 1950, agreement.
"Moreover, plaintiff's former action against Reed was
upon an agreement susceptible to the interpretation that Reed
eonfessed judgment while waiving as to himself the benefit
of prior resort to the mortgage security and yet keeping the
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alive and available for the benefit of plaintiff and
Heed's cosigners. [11] The prohibition against Reed's makany such waiver at the time of or in connection with the
of the loan and the execution of the mortgage (Civ.
§ 2953) signifies authority in Reed later to waive thE'
or privil0ges conferred upon him by section 726 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. (See Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal.2d 263,
266-267 [138 P.2d 7, 146 .A.hR. 1344] .) If after obtaining
against Reed in the former action, plaintiff had
lr:viecl execution against the mortgaged property, bought that
property upon the execution sale, and were now relying 7tpon
the title th7lS acq1tired (as was done by the secured creditor in
the Salter case) plaintiff might find that he had destroyed the
mortgage security or had estopped himself from claiming
any mortgage interest in that property and thereby be precluded from obtaining a deficiency judgment against Reed's
eosigners. But plaintiff has not done that. There is nothing
in the record before us to indicate that he has even taken
out a writ of execution to enforce the judgment in the former
action." (Emphasis added; Williams v. Reed, supra, 113 Cal.
App.2d ] !)5, 205.) [12] We fail to see how the mere recor-dation of the judgment and issuance but not levy of execution
changes that reasoning.
Finally, defendants claim that the $10,000 and $30,000
notes were part of the same transaction (contrary to the
trial court's findings) in which the plaintiff gave only $30,000
and the $10,000 was usnrious 4 interest; that hence the 5 per
eent interest provided for in the $30,000 note should not have
been allowed by the judgment because the whole transaction ifl
tainted with usury. There can be no question that all the
eyidence including plaintiff's is one way, namely, that the
$10,000 note was given as a "bonus" or "finder's fee" for
the loan of $30,000 and nothing else, and was part of the loan
transaction. Plaintiff makes no real contention that the bonus
would not constitute usurious interest (see In re Fuller, 15
'"The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of any money.
goods or things in action, or on accounts after demand or judgment
reJHlercd in any court of the State, shall he 7 per cent per annum but
it shall be competent for the parties to any loan or forbearance of any
goods or things in action to contract in writing for a rate of
not exceeding 10 per con t per annum.
''No person. association, copartnership or corporation shall by charging any fee, bonus, commission. discount or other compensation receive
from a borrower more than 10 per cent per annum upon any loan or
forhcarance of any money, goods or things in action.'' (Cal. Const.,
art. XX, ~· 22; see also Stats. 1919, p. LXXXIII, as amended.)
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Cal.2d 425, 434 [102 P.2d 321]; .Anderson v. Lee, 103 Cal.
App.2d 24 [228 P.2d 613] ; Brown v. Cardoza, 67 Cal.App.2d
187 [153 P.2d 767] ; P,acific Finance Corp. v. Crane, 131
Cal.App.2d 399 [280 P.2d 502]). [13] When the transaction
violates the usury law the intent of neither of the parties is
material (Martin v. Ktwhler, 212 Cal. 536 [299 P. 52]) nor
is it material that the borrower rather than the lender took
the initiative in the transaction (Martin v . .Ajax Const. Co.,
] 24 Cal.App.2d 425 [269 P.2d 132]). [14] Plaintiff claims,
how·ever, that since he dismissed his action on the $10,000
note and the 5 per cent interest specified in the $30,000 is
not usurious, he is entitled to the latter interest as awarded
by the judgment. In Moore v. Rttssell, 114 Cal.App. 634, 641
[300 P. 479], the court said: "The note in controversy having
provided for the payment of $750 bonus and a fiat interest
at seven per cent was plainly usurious. Thus tainted the
plaintiff lost the right to claim or collect interest in any
amount." (Emphasis added; see also Paillet v. Vroman, 52
Cal.App.2d 297, 305 [126 P.2d 419]; Jones v. Dickerman, 114
Cal.App. 357, 361 [300 P. 135]; Hrn:ncs v. CommerciallJJortg.
Co., 200 Cal. 609, 617, 621, 622 [254 P. 956, 255 P. 805, 53
A.L.R. 725]; 91 C.,T.S., Usury, §§56, 58.) Since there is a
single transaction and the whole was tainted by the usury,
it can make no difference that plaintiff dismissed the portion
of his action on the $10,000 note.
The judgment, insofar as it awards interest, is reversed;
in all other respects it is affirmed. Each party shall bear
his own costs on this appeal.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,T., 'rraynor, ,J., Schauer, ,J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.

